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States have the sovereign power to punish criminal offenders as 
long as the constitutional rights of the accused are respected.1 But 
what happens when federal courts liberally disturb states’ interests in 
the finality of verdicts and punishing those that commit crimes?  
On December 3, 1998, Julie Jensen was discovered dead in her 
home she shared with her husband, Mark, and her two sons.2 Weeks 
before Julie’s death she gave a handwritten letter to her neighbors to 
give to the police in the event she died.3 In the letter Julie detailed her 
belief that her husband wanted her dead and would frame her death to 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2016, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute 
of Technology; Moot Court Honor Society Member, 2014–2016; B.S., Accounting, 
2010, Fordham University, Gabelli School of Business. I would like to thank my 
professor, Hal Morris. I would also like to thank my family, especially my lovely 
wife, Danielle, and my friends Brian and Cristina for all of their support.  
1 Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 555––56 (1998).  
2 Jensen v. Clements (“Jensen”), 800 F.3d 892, 896 (7th Cir. 2015). 
3 Id. at 895. 
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look like a suicide.4 After a police investigation, Mark Jensen was 
charged with her murder.5  
Mark Jensen’s lawyers were unsuccessful in challenging the 
admission of Julie’s letter, both before and during the trial, and her 
letter took center stage.6 At the end of the trial, Mark Jensen was 
convicted of her murder and sentenced to life in prison.7 Mark Jensen 
appealed his conviction and the Wisconsin Appellate Court held the 
admission of Julie’s letter, while violative of his right to confrontation, 
was harmless error. 8 On writ of habeas corpus to the federal district 
court, Mark Jensen gained relief, and the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.9 
Errors in a criminal trial can be costly for both the defense and the 
State. If the State makes an error in trial and a defendant is found not 
guilty, the State cannot appeal the acquittal.10 More seriously, if a 
defendant is found guilty of a serious crime she did not commit, the 
consequences can be horrific: the loss of freedom, the loss of 
eligibility for public benefits such as food stamps, assisted housing, 
federal student aid, the loss of opportunities to serve in the military or 
jury service, and for non-citizens, deportation.11 Nowhere else in the 
law are the stakes higher.12 With these high stakes, constitutional 
                                                 
4 Id.  
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Jensen v. Schwochert (“Jensen III”), No. 11-C-0803, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
177420, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 18, 2013). 
8 State v. Jensen (“Jensen I”), 2007 WI 26, ¶ 57, 727 N.W.2d 518, 536. 
9 Jensen, 800 F.3d at 894; Jensen III, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177420, at *1. 
10 U.S. CONST. amend. V (prohibition for government appeal on acquittal) (“No 
person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . .  nor shall any person be subject for 
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb”). 
11 Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on The Collateral Consequences 
Of Criminal Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated 
Individuals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 623, 635–36 (2006). 
12 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3591 (1994) (sentence of death possible for conviction of 
certain offenses).  
2
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protections exist at both the state and federal level to protect criminal 
defendants from unjust and constitutionally violative practices.13 
However, when far-removed appellate courts make determinations of 
fact with little or no deference to the state court decisions under 
review, state court determinations may lose the finality and legality of 
their convictions, undermining states’ sovereign rights and interests in 
punishing those that break their laws.14  
One such protection for criminal defendants is the writ of habeas 
corpus.15 Known as the “great and efficacious writ,” it was once 
referred to by William Blackstone as “another Magna Carta.” 16 Justice 
Anthony Kennedy also once said that “[t]he writ of habeas corpus 
stands as a safeguard against imprisonment of those held in violation 
of the law.”17 Currently, habeas corpus is codified under the amended 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1986 (hereinafter 
referred to as “AEDPA” or 28 U.S.C. § 2254).18 Federal courts may 
entertain a habeas corpus petition of a state prisoner only if the 
convicted defendant is in custody in violation of “the Constitution or 
                                                 
13 See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)  (incorporating the Fourth 
Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure and the exclusionary 
rule); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (incorporating the Fifth Amendment 
right against double jeopardy); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) 
(incorporating the Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination); Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (incorporating the right to assistance of counsel 
under the Eighth Amendment for all cases in which a jail sentence can be imposed). 
14 See generally Brian Hoffstadt, The Deconstruction of Reconstruction of 
Habeas, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1125 (2005) (discussing the history and construction of 
habeas review); see also Julie Austin, Closing a Resentencing Loophole: A Proposal 
to Amend 28 U.S.C. 2255, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 909, 928, 934 (2006) (discussing the 
importance of finality of judgments as a guiding principle in the Supreme Court’s 
analysis of habeas review).  
15 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1996) (outlining the remedy of a writ of habeas corpus 
from the judgment of a state court to a federal court).  
16 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 129-
30; 136 (Neill H. Alford, Jr. et al. eds., The Legal Classics Library 1983) (1768).  
17 Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 90 (2011). 
18 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1996). 
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laws or treaties of the United States.”19 The relevant portion of the 
AEDPA states: 
 
(d)  An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a 
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court 
shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was 
adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless 
the adjudication of the claim-- 
(1)  resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 
(2)  resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in 
the State court proceeding.20 
 
 Once an application for writ of habeas corpus is granted, the 
federal court will conduct a de novo review of the state court’s rulings 
on questions of law21 and mixed legal-factual questions.22 On the other 
hand, reviewing purely factual judgments requires the federal court to: 
(1) adhere to the chain of “prior” courts whose fact-finding the court 
of appeals must defer to unless those facts are “clearly erroneous[,]” 
resulting in deprivation of constitutional rights;23 and (2) examine 
whether the federal district court, in adhering to the first premise, 
                                                 
19 § 2254(a). 
20 § 2254(d). 
21 Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516 (1994) (“The question of law, like the 
generality of such questions must be resolved de novo on appeal.”); see also 
Ellsworth v. Levenhagen, 248 F.3d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 2001). 
22 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 698 (1984); see also Andersen 
v. Thieret, 903 F.2d 526, 529 (7th Cir. 1990) (relying on a “de novo appellate review 
of the district court’s decision on voluntariness [of confession]”); Pruitt v. Neal, 788 
F.3d 248, 264 (7th Cir. 2015). 
23 Mosley v. Butler, 762 F.3d 579, 585 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[W]e review factual 
finding by the district court for clear error [ . . . ] reversing only if the district court’s 
findings are “implausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety”). 
[Parentheticals that are using full quote need to start with capital letter].  
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properly applied the correct standard of review to the applicable state 
court fact findings.24 Additionally, for a review of a state court 
decision, federal courts of appeals review the last state court that 
addressed the merits of the claim, such as the Wisconsin Appellate 
Court in the instant case.25 
Part I of this Article discusses the history of harmless error 
analysis within habeas corpus reviews, specifically with regard to how 
much deference is given to state courts under the current standard. Part 
II discusses the Seventh Circuit’s majority decision and dissent in 
Jensen v. Clements, where the court examined whether the Wisconsin 
Appellate Court misapplied the harmless error standard in affirming 
the trial court’s decision that admission of evidence that violated the 
Confrontation Clause was harmless error in the jury’s guilty verdict. 
Finally, this Article examines the majority and dissenting opinions in 
Jensen—arguing that the Seventh Circuit incorrectly decided Jensen 
based on harmless error standards and that the majority’s failure to 
grant deference to the state court’s decision that erroneously admitted 
evidence was harmless error.26 
 
                                                 
24 The majority of circuits hold that in instances where a district court reviewed 
mixed questions of fact and law solely on the basis of the state court record without 
an evidentiary hearing, the standard appellate review on district court factual 
findings should be “plenary” or “de novo” rather than the deferential “clearly 
erroneous” standard of review for district court findings of fact. See, e.g., Barnett v. 
Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1131 (10th Cir. 1999); Hakeem v. Beyer, 990 F.2d 750, 758 
(3rd Cir. 1993); Schlup v. Armontrout, 941 F.2d 631, 637-38 (8th Cir. 1991). 
However, the 7th Circuit suggested, without deciding, that the “clearly erroneous” 
standard may be appropriate even for mixed questions of fact and law when the 
finding is based purely on documentary evidence. Stewart v. Peters, 958 F.2d 1379, 
1381-82 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 883 (1992). 
25 Id. 
26 This article will not discuss the confrontation clause issues in Jensen v. 
Clements because there is little doubt the admitted evidence at issue violated the 
Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. 
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This section provides an overview of the relevant law concerning 
habeas corpus review and the harmless error analysis. It begins with 
the history of harmless error analysis and the standard’s development 
through Chapman v. California,27 which established the basic 
standard, and Brecht v. Abrahamson,28 which further clarified the 
standard when applied in state courts. Finally, this section examines 
Davis v. Ayala,29 which further refined the harmless error standard 
when state courts rule that an error in admission of evidence is 
harmless, clarifying Chapman and Brecht’s standards.30 In order to 
prevail based on these standards, Petitioner must have shown that the 
Wisconsin Appellate Court’s decision that the admitted evidence 
constituted harmless error was “lacking in justification . . . beyond any 
possibility for fairminded disagreement.” 31 
 
A. Standard of Harmless Error. 
 
Harmless error means “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or 
variance that does not affect substantial rights.”32 Because Jensen 
involves a violation of Confrontation Clause protections, it is 
important to note that a mere violation does not merit automatic 
reversal but is subject to a harmless error analysis.33 The standard for a 
Confrontation Clause error to be held harmless is that “the court must 
be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable 
                                                 
27 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). 
28 Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637  (1993).  
29 Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2197 (2015) (holding that on “direct appeal, 
the harmlessness standard is the one prescribed in Chapman [ . . . but] in a collateral 
proceeding, the test is different). 
30 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24; Brecht, 507 U.S. at 619. 
31 Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2199 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 
(2011)) (emphasis added). 
32 FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a). 
33 Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986). 
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doubt.”34 Errors are truly harmless if the error does not influence the 
jury in their verdict.35 The Supreme Court outlined various factors in 
Delaware v. Van Arsdall that help assess whether an error was truly 
harmless.36 The factors include: (1) the importance of the witness’ 
testimony in the prosecution’s case; (2) whether the testimony was 
cumulative; (3) the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or 
contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points; (4) the 
extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted; and (5) the overall 
strength of the prosecution’s case.37  
The harmless error inquiry cannot merely ask “whether there was 
enough to support the result, apart from the phrase affected by the 
error.”38 Instead, the determination, using the factors in Van Arsdall, is 
whether the error had no or a slight influence on the jury. 39  If there 
was no or little influence then “the verdict and the judgment should 
stand.”40 However, if untainted evidence in a case is so overwhelming 
and “the prejudicial effect [of tainted evidence is] so insignificant by 
comparison, that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
improper use of the admission was harmless error,” then the error had 
no or only a slight influence on the jury and does not subject the 
aggrieved to relief.41 
The Supreme Court in Chapman v. California outlined, in part, 
that federal law rather than state law should determine what 
constituted harmless error in habeas petitions and that when courts 
                                                 
34 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24. 
35 Id. (stating that harmless error is harmless if it “did not contribute to the 
verdict obtained.”). 
36 Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684. 
37 Id. (“these factors . . .  [include] of course, the overall strength of the 
prosecution’s case.”); cf. Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 432 (1972) (stating that 
the “minds of the average jury would not have found the State’s case significantly 
less persuasive had the [improper evidence] been excluded.”)(internal quotations 
omitted).  
38 Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946). 
39 Id. at 764. 
40 Id. 
41 Schneble, 405 U.S. at 430. 
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review errors involving constitutional rights, the court must be 
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless.42 
After Chapman, Congress enacted the AEDPA.43 The AEDPA 
provides that a writ of habeas corpus may not be granted unless the 
state court decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law.”44 The Supreme Court 
incorporated the “unreasonable application” language into the 
Chapman standard in subsequent cases, making the AEDPA and 
Chapman essentially analogous.45  
The Supreme Court defined a separate standard of review in 
Brecht v. Abrahamson.46  The Court held that a petitioner is “not 
entitled to relief based on trial error unless [she] can establish that it 
resulted in ‘actual prejudice.’”47 This Brecht standard distinguished 
itself from the Chapman standard based on the procedural posture of 
the case.48 On a direct appeal, the Chapman standard applies.49 On a 
collateral proceeding, the Brecht standard applies.50 
                                                 
42 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21, 24 (1967) (holding that prosecutors’ 
repeated comments about defendant’s refusal to testify, pursuant to the Fifth 
Amendment, as evidence of guilt, were not harmless error beyond a reasonable 
doubt).  
43 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1996) (amending Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1986). 
44 Jensen v. Clements (“Jensen”), 800 F.3d 892, 899 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)).  
45 Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 18 (2003) (“[W]e may not grant 
respondent’s habeas petition, however, if the state court simply erred in concluding 
that the State’s errors were harmless; rather, habeas relief is appropriate only if the 
[state court] applied harmless-error review in an ‘objectively unreasonable’ 
manner.”); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000) (An 
“unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of 
federal law.”). 
46 Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (quoting United States v. 
Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986)). 
47 Id. 
48 Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2197 (2015). 
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The Brecht standard dictates that habeas relief under AEDPA can 
be granted only if the federal court has “grave doubt about whether a 
trial error of federal law had substantial and injurious effect or 
influence in determining the jury’s verdict.”51 The Court held there 
must be more than a “reasonable possibility” that an error was harmful 
in determining the jury’s verdict.52 Brecht also takes into account the 
concerns of finality and legality that occur when a conviction is 
overturned on direct review.53 Policy-wise, states have public safety 
interest in ensuring criminals are punished,54 and re-litigation of trials 
encounters significant difficulties when cases become stale—namely, 
witnesses die or forget.55  
Confusion over which standard applied on review56 was diffused 
by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Davis v. Ayala.57 In Davis, 
the Court held that a state court’s harmlessness determination under 
AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. §2254(d) (Chapman), is “subsumed” by the Brecht 
                                                                                                                   
49 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (“[B]efore a federal 
constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief 
that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”).  
50 Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 (“[Habeas petitioners] are not entitled to habeas 
relief based on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in ‘actual 
prejudice’.”) (quoting United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986)). 
51 Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2197–98 (quoting O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 
435-36 (1995)) (internal quotations omitted). 
52 Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. 
53 Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 145-46 (1998); see also Brecht, 507 
U.S. at 635 (liberal allowance of habeas corpus damages the importance of trials and 
“encourages habeas petitioners to relitigate their claims on collateral review”).  
54 Brecht, 507 U.S. at 635; see also Calderon, 525 U.S. at 145-46 (“[The] State 
is not to be put to th[e] arduous task of [a retrial] based on mere speculation that the 
defendant was prejudiced by trial error; the court must find that the defendant was 
actually prejudiced by the error.”).  
55 William Glaberson, Courts in Slow Motion, Aided by the Defense, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 14, 2013, at A1. 
56 See Benn v. Greiner, 402 F.3d 100, 105 (2d Cir. 2005) (stating there is an 
“open question” of which standard to apply, Chapman or Brecht, declining to resolve 
this issue since both standards “produce the same result”).  
57 Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2198 (2015). 
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standard when a “federal habeas petitioner contests a state court’s 
determination that a constitutional error was harmless under 
Chapman.”58 Clarifying this holding, the Court stated that while a 
federal court reviewing habeas corpus petitions does not need to 
“’formal[ly]’ apply both Brecht and ‘AEDPA/Chapman,’ AEDPA 
nevertheless ‘sets forth a precondition to the grant of habeas relief.’”59 
If an inquiry has been “adjudicated on the merits” in state court, 
then AEDPA/Chapman’s highly deferential standard is guiding.60 
Once it is determined that the state court made an adjudication on 
merits (such as a harmless error analysis), then in order to grant relief, 
the federal court must determine whether the state court’s rejection 
was “(1) contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly 
established federal law, or (2) was based on an unreasonable 
determination of the facts.”61 A state court’s decision that something 
was harmless error cannot be overturned unless the state court applied 
Chapman’s harmlessness analysis “in an ‘objectively unreasonable’ 
manner.”62 Thus, habeas relief may not be awarded unless “the 
harmlessness determination itself was unreasonable.”63 
The Supreme Court spelled out the definition of “unreasonable” in 
Harrington v. Richter.64 In Harrington, the Court reversed the Ninth 
Circuit’s grant of habeas relief for a defendant convicted of murder 
and other charges.65 The Supreme Court held that while a habeas 
examination must look at the arguments or theories that supported, or 
could have supported, the state court’s decision, the reviewing court 
must also ask “whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree 
                                                 
58 Id. (citing Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 120 (2007)). 
59 Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2198 (quoting Fry, 551 U.S. at 119). 
60 Id. (citing Harrington v. Richter, 551 U.S. 112, 120 (2007)). 
61  Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2198. 
62 Id. (citing Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 18 (2003) quoting Lockyer v. 
Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)). 
63 Fry, 551 U.S. at 119 (emphasis in original); Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2199. 
64 Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102. 
65 Id. at 92. 
10
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that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a 
prior decision of this Court.”66  
 
B. Deference to State Courts. 
 
On questions of whether a harmless error determination was 
indeed harmless, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) spells out that the review is 
“highly deferential”67 and any review of error hinges on whether the 
harmlessness determination itself was unreasonable.68 State fact-
finding in the context of federal claims is of paramount importance 
and often determines whether a petitioner obtains habeas relief.69  
Section 2254(e)(1) of the AEDPA provides:  
 
In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of 
habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the 
judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue 
made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The 
applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption 
of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.70 
 
 The Seventh Circuit recognizes this deferential treatment to state 
court decisions in other determinations.71 In fact, the Seventh Circuit 
                                                 
66 Id. at 102; see also Felkner v. Jackson, 562 U.S. 594, 598 (2011) (holding 
that the state appellate court’s decision on a Batson challenging prosecutors’ race-
neutral explanations for striking jurors was not unreasonable because of evidence the 
California Court of Appeals “carefully reviewed the record at some length in 
upholding the trial court’s findings” and because of this the state appellate court’s 
decision was “plainly not unreasonable”).  
67 See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 390 (2010). 
68 Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102; Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2199. 
69 Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 468, 474 (1974). 
70 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (1996) (emphasis added). 
71 See McElvaney v. Pollard, 735 F.3d 528, 532 (7th Cir. 2013) (deference in 
applying 28 U.S.C. § 2254 review to a Strickland ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim). 
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has followed Supreme Court precedent,72 calling the AEDPA’s 
presumption on state court factual decisions “difficult to [overcome 
because of 28 U.S.C. § 2254’s] highly deferential standard.”73 Courts 
presume that the state court’s factual determinations are correct unless 
a petitioner can show that the state court relied on “fact-finding that 
ignores the clear and convincing weight of the evidence.”74 Much like 
McElvany v. Polland, where the Seventh Circuit stated that the state 
court’s decision that trial counsel was effective must receive “the 
benefit of the doubt,” and in other cases where there is a high 
deferential standard, a tie should go the state court’s determination.75 
With the combination of AEDPA’s requirements for state court factual 
finding deference and the Seventh Circuit’s own precedents, a federal 
court simply disagreeing with a state court’s decision is not enough for 
habeas relief, even if it finds constitutional error under § 2254(d).76 As 
the Supreme Court has previously stated, “the Court never has defined 
the scope of the writ simply by reference to a perceived need to assure 
that an individual accused of crime is afforded a trial free of 
constitutional error.”77 
                                                 
72 Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010) (holding that even if there is 
disagreement during review about the findings in a record that alone does not 
invalidate the trial court’s decision); see also Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 335 
(2006) (“Reasonable minds reviewing the record might disagree . . . but on habeas 
review that does not suffice to supersede the trial court’s credibility determination.”). 
73 Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (quoting Harrington, 562 
U.S. at 102 (2011)); see also McElvaney, 735 F.3d at 532. 
74 Newman v. Harrington, 726 F.3d 921, 928 (7th Cir. 2013) (“This standard is 
demanding, but not insurmountable.” (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Taylor 
v. Grounds, 721 F.3d 809, 817 (7th Cir. 2013))).  
75 McElvaney, 735 F.3d at 532 (quoting Cullen, 563 U.S. at 181 and holding 
that the state appellate court’s determination was not so lacking in justification 
beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement). 
76 Harding v. Walls, 300 F.3d 824, 828 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 
988 (2003) (citing O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436 (1995)). 
77 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308 (1989) (quoting Kuhlman v. Wilson, 477 
U.S. 436, 447 (1986)). 
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JENSEN V. CLEMENTS78 
 
In Jensen v. Clements, the Seventh Circuit determined that the 
harmless error analysis applied by the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
violated the rules set forth in Chapman v. California79 and Brecht v. 
Abrahamson.80 This section begins with the factual history of Jensen, 
followed by a discussion of the procedural history of the case. This 
section then outlines the Seventh Circuit’s majority opinion and ends 
with an examination of Judge Daniel Tinder’s dissent. 
 
A. Factual History 
 
On December 3, 1998 Julie Jensen was discovered deceased in 
her home in Pleasant Prairie, Wisconsin.81 Two weeks prior to her 
death, Julie gave her neighbors a handwritten, signed letter, telling 
them that if “anything happened to her, they should give the envelope 
to the police.”82 Learning of her death, the neighbors gave Julie’s letter 
to the police.83 The letter read: 
 
Pleasant Prairie Police Department, Ron Kosman or 
Detective Ratzburg, 
I took this picture [and] am writing this on Saturday 11-21-98 
at 7 AM. This "list" was in my husband's business daily 
planner—not meant for me to see, I don't know what it 
means, but if anything happens to me, he would be my first 
suspect. Our relationship has deteriorated to the polite 
superficial. I know he's never forgiven me for the brief affair 
I had with that creep seven years ago. Mark lives for work 
[and] the kids; he's an avid surfer of the Internet 
                                                 
78 Jensen v. Clements (“Jensen”), 800 F.3d 892, 896 (7th Cir. 2015). 
79 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). 
80 Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993).  
81
 Jensen v. Clements (“Jensen”), 800 F.3d 892, 896 (7th Cir. 2015). 
82 Id. at 895. 
83 Id. 
13
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Anyway, I do not smoke or drink. My mother was an 
alcoholic, so I limit my drinking to one or two a week. Mark 
wants me to drink more—with him in the evenings. I don't. I 
would never take my life because of my kids—they are 
everything to me! I regularly take Tylenol [and] multi-
vitamins; occasionally take OTC stuff for colds, Zantac, or 
Immodium; have one prescription for migraine tablets, which 
Mark use[s] more than I. 
I pray I'm wrong [and] nothing happens ... but I am 
suspicious of Mark's behaviors [and] fear for my early 
demise. However, I will not leave David [and] Douglas. My 
life's greatest love, accomplishment and wish: "My 3 D's"—
Daddy (Mark), David, Douglas.84  
 
The letter echoed prior statements Julie made to the police in the 
weeks leading up to her death.85 Two voicemails left for the police 
stated that she thought her husband, Mark Jensen (the Petitioner), was 
trying to kill her.86 When officers met with Julie about her voicemails, 
she attempted to give them a roll of film she claimed was taken from 
the Petitioner’s day planner.87 Julie also repeated the statements in her 
letter, saying that if she died her husband should be the first suspect.88 
However, police were unable to connect any of the film’s images to 
the case.89 
After Julie’s death, police seized the Petitioner’s personal 
computer and discovered a history of Internet searches concerning 
suicide and poison, including an Internet search on the morning of 
Julie’s death at 7:40 a.m. for “ethylene glycol poisoning,” commonly 





88 Id. at 896. 
89 Id. 
14
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referred to as antifreeze.90 Also recovered from Petitioner’s computer 
were emails between the Petitioner and a woman with whom he was 
having an affair.91 Evidence showed that the home computer’s Internet 
history was “double-deleted.”92 Petitioner’s work computer was not 
seized because it had ‘“been fried and [Petitioner had] to get a new 
one.’”93  
A medical examiner ruled Julie’s death a suicide after the first 
autopsy was inconclusive.94 However, toxicology reports from Dr. 
Christopher Long stated there was a “large concentration of ethylene 
glycol” in Julie’s system.95 According to Dr. Long, Julie’s system 
contained so much ethylene glycol that he concluded her death could 
not have been a suicide as her body would have been too weak to 
drink the amount of ethylene glycol outlined in his report.96 Three 
years later, in 2002, after an extensive investigation, Julie’s husband, 
Petitioner Mark Jensen, was charged with first-degree intentional 
homicide.97  
 
1. Pre-trial Issues Regarding the Admissibility of Julie’s Voicemails 
and Letter. 
 
The admissibility of Julie’s letter and statements to the police 
before her death were a source of contention from the beginning of the 
case.98 Eventually, the State conceded that the voicemails Julie made 
to the police were inadmissible hearsay, but the letter, in its entirety, 
                                                 
90 Id. (stating that there was 3,940 micrograms per milliliter of ethylene glycol 
in the 660 ml of Julie’s stomach contents). 
91 Id.  
92 Id. at 910 (Tinder, J., dissenting). “Double-deleted” means someone deleted 
the Internet history twice in quick succession. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 896 (majority opinion). 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. Petitioner was charged in March 2002. 
98 Id. 
15
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was ruled admissible hearsay.99 While awaiting trial in 2004, 
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the trial court’s decision to 
allow admission of the letter after the United States Supreme Court 
decided Crawford v. Washington.100 The trial court granted the motion 
and ultimately ruled that Julie’s letter and statements to the police 
were testimonial and barred under Crawford.101 
In an effort to resurrect their case, the State argued that the letter 
and statements were admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule: 
the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing.102 The trial court rejected the 
State’s arguments.103 As a result, the State appealed the trial court’s 
order and filed an interlocutory appeal and petition to bypass directly 
to the Wisconsin Supreme Court.104 In February 2007, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court determined that Julie’s statements to the police and 
handwritten letter were testimonial, but also that the trial court failed 
to properly analyze whether the statements and letter were admissible 
under the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine.105  
On remand from the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the trial court 
found by a preponderance of the evidence that Petitioner killed Julie, 
causing her absence from the trial and therefore satisfying the 
                                                 
99 Id. 
100 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (holding that testimonial 
statements require confrontation to satisfy the constitutional demand of reliability); 
Jensen, 800 F.3d at 896.  
101 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 36 (trial court holding that the letter and voicemails 
were testimonial because the declarant was unable to testify at trial and there was no 
prior opportunity for cross-examination).  
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 State v. Jensen (“Jensen I”), 2007 WI 26, ¶ 2, 299 Wis. 2d 267, 272, 727 
N.W.2d 518, 521. 
105 Jensen, 800 F.3d at 897 (citing Jensen I, 2007 WI at ¶ 57 where the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court ultimately adopted a broad forfeiture by wrongdoing 
doctrine––if the State can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the accused 
caused the absence of the witness, then testimonial evidence is admissible).  
16
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forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine, paving the way for the admission 
of Julie’s statements to police and her letter.106 
 
2. Petitioner’s Trial for First-Degree Intentional Homicide in Julie’s 
Death. 
 
More than nine years after Julie’s death, Petitioner’s case went to 
trial.107 During the six-week jury trial the State presented evidence of 
the actions of Julie and Petitioner in the months leading up to Julie’s 
death.108 During the State’s case, the neighbor that Julie gave the letter 
to testified that three weeks prior to her death, Julie said she was 
“scared she was going to die” and concerned that Petitioner was trying 
to poison her by “put[ting] something in the wine” and insisting Julie 
drink it.109 The neighbor also testified that Julie told him she believed 
she would “not make it through one particular weekend because she 
had found suspicious notes” and a computer page left open on their 
home computer revealing how to poison someone.110 Additionally, the 
neighbor discussed how Julie repeatedly told him about marital 
problems between her and Petitioner.111  
Another witness, Julie’s son’s teacher, testified that approximately 
a week before her death, Julie told the teacher that Julie thought her 
husband was trying to kill her and “’was going to make it look like a 
suicide’” by putting something in her food or drink.112 Julie told the 
teacher that the Petitioner “never forgave her” for an affair she had 
eight years prior.113 The teacher also testified that Julie knew very 
little about computers because a few months prior to Julie’s death the 
                                                 
106 Jensen, 800 F.3d at 897 (citing Jensen I, 2007 WI at ¶ 57). 
107 Jensen, 800 F.3d at 897. 
108 Id. 
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teacher asked Julie to help in the computer lab.114 Julie responded to 
the teacher’s request by saying, “I don’t even know how to turn one 
on.”115  
The State presented additional witnesses: Julie’s physician,  
Petitioner’s friend, and one of Petitioner’s co-workers.116 Julie’s 
physician testified that he saw her two days before her death and she 
denied being suicidal because she “loved her children more than 
anything.”117 The physician also testified that Julie talked about an 
affair she had in the past and that Petitioner had “’never really 
forgiven’ her for it.”118 Both Petitioner’s friend and co-worker testified 
that they were told about an affair Julie had and even after eight years 
the “[Petitioner’s] anger had not diminished” for as long as they knew 
him.119  
Additionally, the friend testified that Petitioner told him that he 
was trying to get Julie to relax at night by giving her wine.120 While 
being questioned by the State, the friend also described Petitioner’s 
computer skills as “above average” and that in the month of Julie’s 
death, Petitioner was searching for drug interactions on the Internet 
“on a very frequent basis.”121 One of the State’s main witnesses was 
the Petitioner’s former cellblock mate, Aaron Dillard.122 Dillard, who 
was awaiting sentencing on his own case, testified that Petitioner 
admitted to him in prison that he “had poisoned Julie and later 
suffocated her by pushing her face into a pillow.”123 
                                                 
114 Id. 
115 Id. (refuting defense notion that Julie could have used the computer herself 
to look for ways to commit suicide). 






122 Id. at 897 (majority opinion). 
123 Id. at 907. 
18
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Additional evidence presented at trial indicated that Petitioner 
would repeatedly place pornographic photographs around the 
residence for Julie to find.124 Petitioner told investigators that he knew 
Julie believed the man she had an affair with was planting the 
images.125 While Petitioner denied placing the photographs, he did 
admit that he would save the photos and use them to upset Julie when 
he was “pissed off.”126 Petitioner also told investigators that he would 
leave the photos out for Julie to find, or bring them out to show 
Julie.127 The lead investigator testified that Petitioner had admitted that 
his marriage with Julie was “never the same” after Julie’s affair.128  
On the morning of Julie’s death, Petitioner told the investigator 
that Julie could not get up and was unable to get out of bed.129 
Petitioner also said that he did not leave that day for work until 8:00 or 
9:00 a.m.130 That fact is especially significant because the time of the 
search for antifreeze poisoning occurred on the same day at 7:40 
a.m.131 Furthermore, evidence showed that on the same day, two 
months before Julie’s death, the Petitioner’s computer was used to 
search for methods of poisoning as well as to exchange emails with 
Petitioner’s paramour about their future life together.132 
The State’s case concluded with testimony from expert witnesses: 
the toxicologist, a doctor who conducted an autopsy, and a medical 
examiner.133 The toxicologist, Dr. Long, outlined his findings that 
there was a “large concentration of ethylene glycol” in Julie’s system 
at the time of her death.134 However, during Dr. Long’s cross-
                                                 







131 Id. at 896 (majority opinion). 
132 Id. at 910 (Tinder, J., dissenting). 
133 Id. at 896 (majority opinion). 
134 Id. 
19
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examination, it was revealed that the 660 ml of Julie’s stomach 
contents contained only a half-teaspoon of ethylene glycol, or .083 
ounces.135 This revelation disclosed on cross-examination, 
“destroy[ed] the foundation of [Dr. Long’s] opinion that Julie’s death 
was not a suicide.” 136 
The doctor that conducted one of the autopsies concluded that 
Julie’s cause of death was asphyxia by smothering and the medical 
examiner concluded her cause of death was “ethylene glycol poisoning 
with probable terminal asphyxia.”137 The testimony that one cause of 
Julie’s death was consistent with smothering arose during the doctor’s 
redirect examination.138 The doctor examined photographs from the 
scene that appeared to show Julie “with an unnaturally bent nose” 
indicating something was pushed hard into Julie’s face.139 
During the defense’s case-in-chief, evidence included testimony 
from Julie’s family doctor.140 The family doctor testified that at an 
appointment two days before Julie’s death, she “seemed depressed and 
distraught and almost frantic, actually.”141 Additionally, the defense 
presented testimony from Julie’s neighbor.142 The day before Julie’s 
death, she had a fifteen minute conversation with her neighbor telling 
her “not to worry if she did not see Julie outside that day because she 
was not feeling well due to her medication.”143 Three days prior to the 
statements made to her neighbor, Julie made similar statements to her 
sister-in-law.144 She told her sister-in-law that she would be ill on 
                                                 
135 Id.  
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 897 (“Surprisingly, this suffocation theory arose for the very first time 
at the trial more than nine years after Julie’s death.”). 
139 Id. Much of the expert witness testimony on the cause of death suffocation 
theory was based on statements from Aaron Dillard, Petitioner’s cellblock mate.  
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December 2, 1998 (one day prior to being discovered dead) because 
she expected to be placed on medication by her family doctor.145  
Additionally, a defense expert witness, Dr. Spiro, told the jury that 
he examined Julie’s medical records and mental health records and 
interviewed those close to her.146 Dr. Spiro’s assessment was that Julie 
was suffering from a “major depressive disorder that was complicated 
by anxiety and agitation with possible delusional features, and he 
concluded that she posed a significant suicide risk.”147 Dr. Spiro’s 
expert opinion was that Julie’s ingestion of antifreeze was suicidal, not 
an accident or homicide.148 Lastly, and key to the defense’s case, 
although Julie made multiple statements to others about how she 
thought her husband was trying to kill her via poison, she made no 
attempt to seek help when she started feeling ill.149  
At argument, the State postulated that Petitioner murdered his 
wife so he could be with his mistress.150 Framing Julie’s death like a 
suicide would avoid a messy divorce, and the State argued that 
Petitioner searched the Internet to look for ways to make Julie’s death 
look like a suicide.151 The defense responded that Julie was unhappy, 
depressed, and committed suicide to make it look like Petitioner killed 
her.152 In rebuttal, the State responded that Julie was a devoted mother, 
who cared about her kids and would not leave them willingly.153 The 
State also argued that Julie could not have ingested the antifreeze 
herself and Petitioner suffocated her after he realized the poison was 
not having the intended effect.154 
                                                 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 907. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 898. 
150 Id. at 897. 
151 Id. 
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Julie’s handwritten letter was highlighted throughout the trial.155 
The letter was discussed at length during the State’s opening 
statements.156 The defense also talked about the letter in its opening, 
even presenting it as a large exhibit for the Jury.157 In closing, the 
State’s last words to the jury on rebuttal stressed the letter, saying, 
“[s]o here was her unexpressed thoughts. [Julie] wrote them down, and 
she hid them away . . . Hid them away until she could resolve this 
terrible dilemma she was in.”158 The jury deliberated for nearly thirty 
hours and came back with a verdict that the Petitioner was guilty of 
first-degree intentional homicide.159 
 
3.  Post-Petitioner’s Conviction. 
Four months after Petitioner’s guilty verdict at the hands of a jury, 
Giles v. California160 decisively narrowed the interpretation of the 
forfeiture by wrongdoing statute relied on by the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court in its decision prior to Petitioner’s conviction.161 Based on 
Giles, the Petitioner appealed his conviction because of the state 
court’s error in admitting Julie’s letter under the hearsay exception of 
forfeiture by wrongdoing, directly in opposition to Giles’ decision that 
for the exception to apply there must be an intention to prevent the 
witness from testifying, not merely causing death.162 The Wisconsin 
                                                 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 904-05. The letter was used to “underscore [the State’s] themes of 
Petitioner’s motive, Julie’s fear, and the absence of her intent to take her own life.” 
157 Id. Defense counsel described the letter to the jury, saying “[w]e’ll come 
back to the letter many times during this case, and you’ll have to decide whether it’s 
a blueprint for framing her husband or legitimate.”  
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 898. 
160 See generally Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008) (reversing a 
Petitioner’s conviction for first-degree murder after the victim’s out-of-court 
statements were admitted under California’s forfeiture by wrongdoing statute. The 
Court held that forfeiture by wrongdoing requires that the defendant intended to 
prevent a witness from testifying and was not merely absent from the case). 
161 State v. Jensen (“Jensen I”), 2007 WI 26, ¶ 57, 727 N.W.2d 518, 536. 
162 Jensen, 800 F.3d at 897. 
22
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Appellate Court subsequently found that “the disputed testimonial 
evidence [, Julie’s letter and statements to police, were] erroneously 
admitted” but that any error was harmless—affirming Petitioner’s 
conviction.163 Jensen petitioned the Wisconsin Supreme Court for 
review of the Wisconsin Appellate Court’s decision, but that petition 
was denied.164 As a result of the denial, Petitioner filed a petition for 
writ of habeas corpus in federal court.165 
In reviewing Petitioner’s habeas corpus assertions, the Eastern 
District of Wisconsin held that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals 
unreasonably applied the Chapman standard of review,166 stating, 
“having reviewed the voluminous trial record, the court concludes that 
the erroneously admitted testimonial statements had a ‘substantial and 
injurious effect’ on the jury’s verdict.”167 Making this determination, 
the district court examined the “host of factors” applicable to harmless 
error review and found that Julie’s “letter from the grave” cannot be 
harmless when viewed in the entire context of the trial.168 Ultimately, 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin 
granted Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition, and the prison warden 
appealed.169 
 
B. Seventh Circuit’s Majority Opinion. 
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s decision to grant Petitioner’s writ of 
habeas corpus on the basis that the Wisconsin Appellate Court’s 
harmless error determination reflected an unreasonable application of 
                                                 
163 State v. Jensen (“Jensen II”), 2011 WI App. 3, 331 Wis. 2d 440, 794 N.W. 
2d 482, 493 (Wis. App. Ct. 2010). 
164 Jensen, 800 F.3d at 898. 
165 Jensen v. Schwochert (“Jensen III”), No. 11-C-0803, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 177420 at *17 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 18, 2013). 
166 Id. at *31. 
167 Id. (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 622 (1993)). 
168 Jensen III, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177420 at *30-31. 
169 Jensen, 800 F.3d at 898. 
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Chapman’s substantial and injurious influence or effect standard.170 
Judge Ann Claire Williams, joined by Judge David Hamilton, outlined 
the Seventh Circuit’s majority opinion detailing why admitting Julie’s 
letter and out-of-court statements had substantial and injurious effect 
on the jury verdict.171 
The majority first examined whether the Chapman or Brecht 
standard applied, noting confusion prior to Ayala.172 The majority 
concluded that Petitioner needed to meet the Brecht standard that 
incorporates Chapman’s state court decision of whether the error was 
harmless.173 In meeting the prevailing standard for review, the Seventh 
Circuit questioned whether the Seventh Circuit was in “grave doubt” 
about whether the confrontation error had “substantial and injurious 
effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict” in the Petitioner’s 
case.174 Next, the Seventh Circuit applied their own harmless error 
analysis, noting that the harmless error inquiry is “not the same as a 
review for whether there was sufficient evidence at trial to support a 
verdict.”175 Finally, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the Wisconsin 
State Court’s determination that the error was harmless was 
unreasonable. 176 
 
                                                 
170 Id. at 895 (holding in part that Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008) was 
decided before Petitioner’s claim was adjudicated on the merits by the Wisconsin 
state courts). 
171 Jensen, 800 F.3d at 901. 
172 Id.; Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967); Brecht, 507 U.S. at 619; 
Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187 (2015). 
173 Jensen, 800 F.3d at 901; Chapman, 386 U.S. at 18; Brecht, 507 U.S. at 619; 
Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2187. 
174 Jensen, 800 F.3d at 904 (emphasis in original) (quoting Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 
2198 (2015)). 
175 Jensen, 800 F.3d at 902 (citing Supreme Court cases supporting the 
principle that harmless error analysis is not just about sufficiency of evidence). 
176 Jensen, 800 F.3d at 895. 
24
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1.  The Seventh Circuit’s Issue with the Wisconsin Appellate Court’s 
Reasoning. 
 
The Seventh Circuit took issue with the Wisconsin Appellate 
Court’s reasoning, stating, “[the opinion] reads as though [the 
appellate court] is conducting an evaluation of whether there was 
sufficient evidence to support the verdict, not whether the error in 
admitting Julie’s letter and statements to the police affected the jury’s 
verdict.”177 The majority reinforced this criticism by illustrating the 
Wisconsin Appellate Court’s analysis of duplicative evidence.178  
 The Wisconsin Appellate Court’s opinion stated how “[t]he rest of 
the record reflects that the jury had overwhelming evidence of murder, 
and upon [that] record [the jury] could rationally have concluded 
beyond a reasonable doubt that [Petitioner] murdered Julie.”179 The 
Seventh Circuit pointed to this statement by the Wisconsin Appellate 
Court as demonstrating “that it is conducting a review for whether 
there is sufficient evidence to support a verdict” rather than the 
harmless error examination required in the present case.180  
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit noted how the sufficiency of the 
evidence statements by the Wisconsin Appellate Court are not just 
“slips of the pen.”181 What was lacking, the Seventh Circuit noted, was 
any discussion by the Wisconsin Appellate Court about what defense 
evidence rebutted the State’s, such as defense expert witnesses and 
cross examination testimony.182 To the majority, this lack of in-depth 
analysis bolstered their view that the state appellate court’s opinion 
was insufficient, noting that the Supreme Court has held that when 
only one party’s evidence is evaluated, “no logical conclusion can be 
                                                 
177 Id. at 903. 
178 Id. 
179 State v. Jensen (“Jensen II”), 2011 WI App 3, ¶ 71, 331 Wis. 2d 440, 473, 
794 N.W.2d 482, 498. 
180 Jensen, 800 F.3d at 903-04 (noting that under direct appeal the evidence is 
viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction). 
181 Id. at 904. 
182 Id. 
25
Welch: Deference to the Lower Court: How the Seventh Circuit Improperly
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2016
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                       Volume 11, Issue 2                        Spring 2016 
 
256 
reached regarding the strength of contrary evidence offered by the 
other side to rebut or cast doubt.”183 
 
2.  The Seventh Circuit’s Examination of Van Arsdall’s Harmless Error 
Factors. 
 
In light of the factors outlined by the Supreme Court in Delaware 
v. Van Arsdall, the Seventh Circuit then examined what influence 
Julie’s letter and statements to the police had on the jury verdict.184 
The majority highlighted the first Van Arsdall factor—the importance 
of the witness’ testimony in the State’s case.185 The court pointed out 
that the letter is unlike any other evidence presented in the trial; it is 
Julie’s words from a time close to her death.186 The court noted that 
the letter was emotional and dramatic, used by the State in openings, 
closings, and as the last words in their rebuttal argument.187 The court 
stated, “damaging evidence stands impregnable—irretrievably lodged 
in the jurors’ minds.”188 
The Seventh Circuit also stressed the importance of the letter to 
witnesses, the Petitioner, and the State’s case.189 The letter was 
published to the jury; twelve of the witnesses testified about the letter, 
including some expert witnesses that stated the letter influenced their 
opinions; and the State published Petitioner’s reaction to the letter in a 
                                                 
183 Id. (quoting Homes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 331 (2006)).  
184 Jensen, 800 F.3d at 904 (“[W]e look to 'a host of factors,' such as 'the 
importance of the witness' testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony 
was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting 
the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination 
otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution's case.”) 
(quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986)). 
185 Jensen, 800 F.3d at 904. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. at 904-05. Petitioner also used the letter but only as means to rebut the 
State’s assertions. 
188 Id. at 905 (citing United States v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758, 781 (D.C. Cir. 
1973)). 
189 Jensen, 800 F.3d at 905. 
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videotaped interview with police.190 Bolstering its viewpoint, the 
majority highlighted statements made by the State during pre-trial 
motions, calling the letter “essential,” “highly relevant,” and 
“extraordinar[ily] valu[able].”191 According to the Seventh Circuit, the 
Wisconsin Appellate Court’s finding that the letter and statements 
were harmless was unreasonable because of the amount of times the 
State’s case referenced or relied on the letter.192 
The Seventh Circuit then addressed the last factor under Van 
Arsdall—the overall strength of the State’s case.193 The Seventh 
Circuit derided the state appellate court for not engaging with the 
defense evidence, using language from the district court that, “[a] 
reader of the court of appeals’ opinion would conclude that Jensen 
called no witnesses, introduced no evidence, [and] never questioned 
the credibility of any witness.”194  
In examining the strength of the State’s case, particularly 
addressing the State’s computer evidence, the majority discussed 
testimony from the son’s teacher about Julie’s computer usage, and 
lack of computer usage, from times that Petitioner was not at home. 195 
The majority also responded to the Wisconsin Appellate Court’s 
opinion that the State’s computer evidence was “untainted and 
undisputed,” stating the evidence was far from undisputed: “[N]o 
evidence precluded a jury from finding that Julie did at least some of 
the Internet searches.”196 The Seventh Circuit also highlighted defense 
                                                 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 905-06 (quoting State v. Jensen (“Jensen II”), 2011 WI App 3, ¶ 73, 
331 Wis. 2d 440, 474, 794 N.W.2d 482, 499) (“[The State] also called the letter’s 
admissibility ‘a make or break issue’ from the State’s perspective. While the 
Wisconsin appellate court found the improperly admitted evidence added ‘nothing 
significant beyond the properly admitted nontestimonial statements’”).  
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witnesses that refuted Julie’s computer illiteracy claims, as well as the 
lack of searches for poison on Petitioner’s work computer.197 
Next, the court addressed the appellate court’s failure to engage 
the defense’s evidence regarding Julie’s state of mind.198 Both the 
family doctor and a defense expert testified Julie was depressed and 
when the defense expert reviewed Julie’s mental health history, 
determined that Julie was a significant suicide risk and her death was 
likely the result of suicide.199 Additionally, the Seventh Circuit took 
issue with the amount of time it took one of the State’s witnesses to 
come forward and testify.200  
Lastly, the Seventh Circuit opined that the State’s case was “no 
slam dunk. The evidence was all circumstantial.”201 In the Seventh 
Circuit’s majority opinion, because the Wisconsin Appellate Court did 
not formally engage any of the defense evidence and the defense had a 
lot of evidence, the erroneously admitted letter and statements resulted 
in actual prejudice.202 Because of this, the majority held that the state 
appellate court’s ruling was “not simply incorrect” and that “[t]he error 
in admission had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in 
determining the jury’s verdict . . . [and the result here goes] beyond 
any possibility for fair-minded disagreement.”203 As such, the Seventh 
Circuit granted Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition, holding that 
because Petitioner satisfied the Brecht standard, he also satisfied “the 
AEDPA standard of an unreasonable application of the Chapman 
                                                 
197 Id. Evidence from the trial indicates that Petitioner’s work computer was 
destroyed before police were able to gain access to it as part of their investigation. 
198 Id. at 906-07. 
199 Id. at 907. 
 200 Id. The witness was a friend of the Petitioner that stated Petitioner made 
inculpatory statements to him about how if the Petitioner wanted to kill his wife then 
there are websites showing how to poison people and he could use those. 
201 Id. at 906. 
202 Id. at 908. 
203 Id. (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)). 
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harmless error standard.”204 Currently, Petitioner is awaiting retrial of 
his wife’s murder.205 
 
C. Judge Tinder’s Dissent 
 
Judge Tinder penned the dissent in the case.206 Judge Tinder 
agreed with the majority holding that Julie’s letter and statements to 
the police were admitted in violation of Petitioner’s Confrontation 
Clause rights.207 However, Judge Tinder also stated that the majority 
opinion improperly decided whether admitting the letter and 
statements were in fact harmful.208 The dissent outlined the 
determination that fairminded jurists could agree with the Wisconsin 
Court of Appeals.209 Because of this possibility for disagreement, 
coupled with the requirement that there must be deference to the state 
court’s decision, Judge Tinder would uphold the decision of the 
Wisconsin Court of Appeals as a reasonable application of 
Chapman.210 
Judge Tinder also highlighted the standard that Petitioner must 
meet to prevail on his habeas petition: “[T]o prevail, a petitioner must 
show that the state court’s decision to reject his claim was so lacking 
in justification that there was an error well understood and 
comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded 
disagreement.”211 Judge Tinder asserted that the Wisconsin decision 
                                                 
204 Jensen, 800 F.3d at 908. 
205 Update: Bond Set For Man Convicted in Wife’s Death After Poisoning, 
NBC WMTV (Jan. 6, 2016, 3:11 PM), 
http://www.nbc15.com/home/headlines/15852777.html (last updated January 6, 
2016) (“A judge has set a $1.2 million bond for a Wisconsin man once convicted in 
his wife’s death.”).  
206 Jensen, 800 F.3d at 908 (Tinder, J., dissenting). 
207 Id. 
208 Id. (“[W]e are not in a position to choose between two fairminded 
alternatives.”). 
209 Id. at 909. 
210 Id. 
211 Id. at 910 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)). 
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was not so lacking.212 In support of this contention, Judge Tinder 
pointed to the Van Arsdall factors.213 
Judge Tinder addressed additional State evidence corroborating 
Julie’s letter and statements to police, such as the computer evidence 
and statements Julie made to other witnesses, and he pointed out that 
there were multiple sources of admissible evidence “duplicating (or 
corroborating) every relevant aspect of Julie’s erroneously admitted 
testimonial statements.”214 All of this evidence, the dissent stated, 
contributed to the state appellate court’s characterization of the 
“staggering weight of the untainted evidence and cumulatively sound 
evidence presented by the State.”215 
Judge Tinder noted that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals 
recognized the defense theories, even noting that “’[t]his case was not 
a classic whodunit,’” but rather “the jury was asked to choose between 
two dark and premeditated alternatives—either [Petitioner] murdered 
Julie and framed it to look like suicide, or Julie committed suicide and 
framed [Petitioner] for murder.”216 Judge Tinder went on to say that 
each of Julie’s testimonial statements, as well as the other 
corroborating evidence, could support either theory.217  
Referencing the majority’s rejection of the Wisconsin Court of 
Appeals’ decision, the dissent also pointed out that the state appellate 
court did say that it “review[ed] the extensive record”—but even if the 
state appellate court had just said “affirmed,” that is enough that the 
federal appellate court should give the “full deference that the habeas 
corpus statute demands” of state court determinations.218 Additionally, 
the dissent highlighted that the Supreme Court’s own precedent 
                                                 
212 Jensen, 800 F.3d at 908 (Tinder, J., dissenting). 
213 Id. at 909. 
214 Id. 
215 Id. (quoting State v. Jensen (“Jensen II”), 2011 WI App 3, ¶ 94, 331 Wis. 
2d 440, 483-84, 794 N.W.2d 482, 504). 
216 Jensen, 800 F.3d at 911 (Tinder, J., dissenting) (quoting Jensen III, 2011 
WI App at ¶ 37). 
217 Jensen, 800 F.3d at 911 (Tinder, J., dissenting). 
218 Id. (citing Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98-99 (2011)). 
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prohibits federal courts from inferring error from a state court’s failure 
to address particular evidence.219 
Even though the state appellate court decision includes statements 
that appear to employ a sufficiency-of-the-evidence test, there is 
enough reiteration of its “finding of harmlessness based on ‘the 
staggering weight of the untainted evidence and cumulatively sound 
evidence presented by the State’” that lends itself to a harmlessness 
inquiry.220 Most telling to the dissent was the state appellate court 
conclusion that “the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that 
any error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.”221 
These statements and the evidence itself leave Judge Tinder 
“[un]convinced that the state court’s decision ‘was so lacking in 
justification that there was an error well understood and 





The Seventh Circuit incorrectly decided Jensen v. Clements 
because it misapplied the harmless error standard and failed to provide 
enough deference to the state court’s decision. Merely having a 
constitutional error is not enough to grant habeas relief.223 Instead, the 
habeas standard Petitioner must meet is that the error had substantial 
and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict and 
that there was actual prejudice.224  
Here, the Wisconsin Appellate Court examined the record of 
Petitioner’s case and determined that any effect of the erroneously 
                                                 
219 Jensen, 800 F.3d at 911 (Tinder, J., dissenting) (quoting Price v. Thurmer, 
637 F.3d 831, 839 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Harrington, 562 U.S. at 98-99)). 
220 Jensen, 800 F.3d at 911-12 (Tinder, J., dissenting). 
221 Id. 
222 Id. at 911 (quoting Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2199 (2015)). 
223 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308 (1989) 
224 Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993). 
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admitted letter and statements was harmless.225 Thus, in order to 
prevail, the Petitioner “must [have] show[n] that the state court’s 
decision to reject his claim ‘was so lacking in justification that there 
was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law 
beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.’”226  
The Wisconsin Appellate Court’s decision may not have been 
perfectly reasoned, but their decision certainly is subject to fairminded 
disagreement. As such, Petitioner should fail on this standard because 
fairminded jurists did disagree on the Wisconsin Appellate Court’s 
determination.227 More than that, while this outcome may not sit well 
with Petitioner, it is the correct determination when all of the Van 
Arsdall factors are examined and proper deference is granted to the 
state court’s determination. 
 
A. The Seventh Circuit Incorrectly Decided Jensen v. Clements by 
Misapplying the Harmless Error Standard. 
 
As stated above, the factors for a harmless error analysis under 
Van Arsdall include: (1) the importance of the witness’ testimony in 
the prosecution’s case; (2) whether the testimony was cumulative; (3) 
the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the 
testimony of the witness on material points; (4) the extent of cross-
examination otherwise permitted; and (5) the overall strength of the 
prosecution’s case.228 While the Seventh Circuit’s majority opinion 
touched upon some of these factors, they failed to adequately address 
each of them. 
The majority highlighted at length the first Van Arsdall factor, the 
importance of the inadmissible evidence, as the key to showing the 
                                                 
225 State v. Jensen (“Jensen II”), 2011 WI App 3, ¶ 73, 331 Wis. 2d 440, 473, 
794 N.W.2d 482, 499. 
226 Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2199 (emphasis added) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 
562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)). 
227 See Jensen, 800 F.3d at 911; Jensen II, 2011 WI App at ¶ 73. 
228 Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986). 
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unreasonable nature of the Wisconsin Appellate Court’s decision.229 
However, the majority failed to emphasize the next three factors Van 
Arsdall factors that inform and minimize whatever harm was found by 
the Seventh Circuit’s majority.230 All of the inadmissible evidence is 
corroborated or duplicated by admissible evidence. This is why the 
cumulative factors are so important; it is not an all or nothing analysis 
hinging on just the importance of the inadmissible evidence. If the 
examination did hinge on just one of the factors, then the Seventh 
Circuit would not have reiterated the Supreme Court’s decision that all 
the factors guide this analysis and play an important role. 231 To be 
clear, this Article does not argue that the letter was unimportant or 
non-violative of Petitioner’s Confrontation right. However, the mere 
fact that witnesses discussed Julie’s letter and the State highlighted 
their testimony in argument is only one factor in the overall analysis of 
whether admitting the letter was ultimately injurious and had an effect 
on the jury’s verdict.  
Illustrating factors two and three of Van Arsdall’s holding, the 
Wisconsin Appellate Court went through each and every line in Julie’s 
letter—all three paragraphs—and examined how the inadmissible 
evidence was corroborated or duplicated by admissible evidence.232 
Family, friends, neighbors, acquaintances, and police officers all 
testified to statements Julie made to them that corroborated 
information in the letter.233 The corroboration did not stop with live 
testimony; even physical evidence recovered from Petitioner’s home 
computer echoed Julie’s statements to friends about Petitioner 
searching for ways to poison someone on the internet.234  
Furthermore, factor four is satisfied because the defense had an 
opportunity to cross-examine each and every one of the corroborating 
witnesses and rebut any physical evidence through their own experts 
                                                 
229 Jensen, 800 F.3d at 905-06. 
230 Id. at 906. 
231 Id. at 904. 
232 Jensen II, 2011 WI App at ¶¶ 40-73. 
233 Id. 
234 Jensen, 800 F.3d at 910 (Tinder, J., dissenting). 
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or argument. “Cross examination is ‘the greatest legal engine ever 
invented for the discovery of truth’”235 and Petitioner cross-examined 
the State’s witnesses. There were even questions at trial about the 
authenticity of the letter itself.236 Yet, any impeachment was 
apparently unpersuasive to the jury.237  
Finally, the Seventh Circuit’s majority extensively examined the 
final Van Arsdall factor, the overall strength of the prosecution’s 
case.238 The majority repeatedly remarked about statements made by 
the Wisconsin Appellate Court regarding the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support the verdict.239 The Seventh Circuit worried the 
state appellate court was unconcerned with the Brecht harmless error 
analysis, instead focusing on an incorrect sufficiency of the evidence 
test.240 However, the statements by the Wisconsin Appellate Court 
regarding the strength of the evidence of guilt are illustrative of the 
last Van Arsdall factor, rather than a superficial examination of the 
sufficiency of guilt as the Seventh Circuit contends.241  
The majority cited to Holmes v. South Carolina, stating that if 
only one side is evaluated on review, “no logical conclusion can be 
reached regarding the strength of contrary evidence offered by the 
other side to rebut or cast doubt.” 242 However, the Wisconsin Court of 
Appeals did “review the extensive record” and examined “the 
voluminous corroborating evidence, the duplicative untainted 
                                                 
235 Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 124 (1999) (internal quotations omitted)  
(quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970)). 
236 Jensen, 800 F.3d at 911 (Tinder, J., dissenting). 
237 Id. at 898 (majority opinion); see also Jensen II, 2011 WI App at ¶ 88. One 
of the detectives was impeached on his testimony that Petitioner admitted he was the 
principle computer user in the house and that Julie rarely used the computer. 
238 Jensen, 800 F.3d at 906. 
239 Id. at 903-04. 
240 Id. 
241 Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986). 
242 Jensen, 800 F.3d at 904 (quoting Homes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 
331 (2006)).  
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evidence, the nature of the defense, the nature of the State’s case, and 
the overall strength of the State’s case.”243  
The First Circuit was faced with a similar issue in Barbosa v. 
Mitchell, in January of 2016.244 In Barbosa, an inmate petitioned for a 
writ of habeas corpus because a DNA expert’s testimony included a 
DNA “results table” that was clearly in violation of established law 
under the Confrontation Clause.245 Relying almost entirely on factor 
four of Van Arsdall, the First Circuit found that there was an 
“abundance of other evidence indicating [petitioner’s] guilt.”246 Based 
on the “force of this [cumulative] evidence as a whole” the First 
Circuit determined the inadmissible DNA table was “largely 
cumulative evidence” and could not conclude that the violative 
evidence had “a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict.”247 As 
in Barbosa, the Seventh Circuit here was obliged to give great weight 
to the Van Arsdall factors that the evidence was cumulative, there was 
corroborating testimony, and the strength of the prosecution’s case. 
The Wisconsin Appellate Court went further than the state court on 
review in Barbosa, discussing how they reviewed the “extensive 
record” and conducting a meticulous evaluation of the evidence.248 
Lastly, the Seventh Circuit opined that the evidence in the case 
was all circumstantial and subject to more than one interpretation, but 
this statement cuts both ways.249 Circumstantial evidence can be just 
as reliable as direct evidence, as the Supreme Court has held, “[t]he 
adequacy of circumstantial evidence also extends beyond civil cases; 
we have never questioned the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence in 
                                                 
243 State v. Jensen (“Jensen II”), 2011 WI App 3, ¶ 35, 331 Wis. 2d 440, 462, 
794 N.W.2d 482, 493 (emphasis added). 
244 Barbosa v. Mitchell, 812 F.3d 62, 68 (1st Cir. 2016).  
245 Id. 
246 Id. 
247 Id. at 69. 
248 State v. Jensen (“Jensen II”), 2011 WI App 3, ¶ 97, 331 Wis. 2d 440, 485, 
794 N.W.2d 482, 504 (emphasis added). 
249 Jensen v. Clements (“Jensen”), 800 F.3d 892, 906 (7th Cir. 2015). 
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support of a criminal conviction.”250 In fact, there are no instances 
where the Supreme Court has said that circumstantial evidence is 
weaker than direct evidence.251 Just because Petitioner’s verdict relied 
on evidence that may be circumstantial or subject to more than one 
interpretation does not eviscerate or weaken that verdict.252 The only 
question relevant in the instant case is if the Wisconsin State Court’s 
decision was so lacking in justification that there is no possibility for 
fair-minded disagreement on the harmless error analysis. 253 The 
answer is no; there is the possibility for fair-minded disagreement in 
that fair-minds could conclude that the Wisconsin State Court’s 
decision to admit the handwritten letter constituted harmless error. 
 
B. The Seventh Circuit Failed to Show Enough Deference to the 
Wisconsin Appellate Court’s Decision that Any Error was Harmless. 
 
In addition to the Seventh Circuit’s tilted application of the 
harmless error analysis, the Seventh Circuit should have deferred to 
the Wisconsin Appellate Court’s findings that the admission of Julie’s 
letters and statements were harmless error. The “highly deferential” 
review under § 2254(d) defers to state court decisions of fact unless 
those determinations were unreasonable.254 Here, the Wisconsin 
appellate court determined that the wrongly admitted evidence did not 
have a substantial and injurious effect on the Petitioner. Merely 
because the Seventh Circuit could have reached a different conclusion 
does not overcome § 2254(d)(2)’s requirement for state court 
                                                 
250 Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954) (circumstantial 
evidence is “intrinsically no different from testimonial evidence”). 
251 Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 100 (2003). 
252 The majority also makes mention that nothing was found on Petitioner’s 
work computer, but the computer was “fried” prior to being seized by the police; see 
Jensen, 800 F.3d at 910 (Tinder, J., dissenting). 
253 Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2199 (2015) (quoting Harrington v. 
Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)). 
254 Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102; Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2199. 
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substantial deference.255 Even under a de novo review of the record, 
there is ample evidence that the Wisconsin Appellate Court applied the 
Van Arsdall factors.256 Since the above sections of this Article 
establish that the Seventh Circuit erred in deciding that the Wisconsin 
Appellate Court’s determination was unreasonable, the state court’s 
decision must stand. 
As Judge Posner stated in Price v. Thurmer, where a habeas 
Petitioner asked for relief on an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim, the Wisconsin Court of Appeal’s opinion, which “ignored a 
good deal of the evidence on which his claim for relief was based,” 
still had to be given full deference.257 After the Supreme Court’s ruling 
in Harrington,258 Judge Posner stated, “a state court ‘opinion’ 
consisting of a single word ‘affirmed’ is entitled to the full deference 
that the habeas corpus statute demands.”259 Because of the Supreme 
Court ruling in Harrington, the Seventh Circuit held in Price that they 
could not infer error from the Wisconsin court’s failure to address 
particular evidence.260 
Other circuits have come to a similar conclusion regarding 
interpretation of Harrington.261 For example, in 2015 the Fourth 
Circuit in Christian v. Ballard decided that a petitioner’s ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim during a guilty plea was not an 
unreasonable application of the “clearly established” principles of the 
                                                 
255 Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2277 (2015) (holding that the state 
court erroneously found that a prisoner was improperly denied a hearing to 
determine whether he was intellectually disabled and precluded from his death 
sentence). 
256 See supra Part(A).  
257 Price v. Thurmer, 637 F.3d 831, 839 (7th Cir. 2011). 
258 Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102. 
259 Price, 637 F.3d at 839; contra Contreras v. Artus, 778 F.3d 97, 106 (2d Cir. 
2015) (holding that a petitioner’s denial of habeas relief was not unreasonable 
because the state court did a long summation of the facts, including the defense 
evidence). 
260 Price, 637 F.3d at 839. 
261 Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102; Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2199 (2015). 
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Strickland v. Washington standard of effective assistance of counsel.262 
The Fourth Circuit stated that the requirement of a petitioner’s 
showing that the claim “resulted from an unreasonable legal or factual 
conclusion” beyond any fair-minded disagreement “does not require 
that there be an opinion from the state court explaining the state 
court’s reasoning.”263  
As a result, even when a state court’s decision is “unaccompanied 
by an explanation, the habeas petitioner’s burden must still be met” by 
showing that there was no reasonable basis and that it is impossible for 
fair-minded jurists to agree on arguments or theories.”264 That same 
wisdom espoused by the Seventh Circuit in Price should also apply to 
the instant case. While the Wisconsin Appellate Court could have done 
a better job of addressing all the evidence, the length of the trial and 
“extensive record” dictated that the state court’s opinion only address 
information they believed relevant to the Van Arsdall harmless error 
factors.265  
The Wisconsin Appellate Court went beyond merely saying 
“affirmed,” and instead examined the “voluminous [evidence,] . . .  the 
nature of the defense . . . [and] the overall strength of the State’s 
case.”266 Given that there is no requirement that fair-minded jurists 
must all agree with the state court decision, the Wisconsin Appellate 
Court’s determination that any error from the inadmissible evidence 
was harmless and should stand.  
The Supreme Court stated in Harrington that the habeas standard 
is “difficult to meet . . . because it was meant to be.”267 Federal habeas 
jurisdiction is designed so that state courts are the “principal forum for 
                                                 
262 Christian v. Ballard, 792 F.3d 427, 445-46 (4th Cir. 2015) (citing Strickland 
v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668, 671 (1984)). 
263 Christian, 792 F.3d at 444-45 (internal quotations omitted) (citing 
Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102). 
264 Christian, 792 F.3d at 445; see also McKinney v. Ryan, 813 F.3d 798, 838-
39 (Bea, J., dissenting). 
265 State v. Jensen (“Jensen II”), 2011 WI App 3, ¶ 35, 331 Wis. 2d 440, 462, 
794 N.W.2d 482, 493. 
266 Id. at ¶ 35 (emphasis added). 
267 Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102. 
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asserting constitutional challenges to state convictions.”268 This is 
because federal habeas petitions “frustrate[] both States’ sovereign 
power to punish offenders and their good-faith attempts to honor 
constitutional rights” and “disturb[] the State’s significant interest in 
repose for conclud[ing] litigation, deny[ing] society the right to punish 
admitted offenders, and intrud[ing] on state sovereignty to a degree 
matched by few exercises of judicial authority.”269 Much like 
Harrington, the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Jensen, “illustrates a lack 
of deference to the state court’s determination and an improper 
intervention in state criminal processes, contrary to the . . .  well-





In Jensen v. Clements, the Seventh Circuit held that the Wisconsin 
Appellate Court unreasonably applied federal law when it determined 
that the admission of Julie’s letter and statements was harmless error. 
The majority’s application of the harmless error analysis fails to 
properly examine all of the relevant factors and evidence and fails to 
adequately grant deference to the state court, as required by the habeas 
statute itself.271 The Seventh Circuit’s fact-intensive analysis of 
Jensen, and Judge Tinder’s dissent, shows that the state court’s 
decision should be granted a high level of deference and was not “so 
lacking in justification that there -was an error well- understood and 
comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded 
disagreement.”272 Holding otherwise undermines the meaning of 
                                                 
268 Id. at 109. 
269 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Calderon v. Thompson, 523 
U.S. 538, 555-556 (1998) and Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 265 (1989) (Kennedy, 
J., dissenting)). 
270 Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102. 
271 Jensen, 800 F.3d at 911 (Tinder, J., dissenting) (citing Harrington v. 
Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98-99 (2011)). 
272 Jensen v. Clements (“Jensen”), 800 F.3d 892, 909, 910 (7th Cir. 2015) 
(Tinder, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103). 
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habeas review and States’ sovereign rights and interests in punishing 
criminals, which ultimately serves to weaken the finality and legality 
that attaches to convictions after all review is exhausted.273 
                                                 
273 See Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 145-46 (1998) (noting that states 
have a sovereign interest in punishing offenders when examining the Brecht 
standard).  
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